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Introduction	
Overview	&	Purpose	
Through funding from the National Science Foundation, the Center for Trustworthy Scientific 
Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) is committed to improve the cybersecurity of NSF science and 
engineering projects, while allowing those projects to focus on their science endeavors.  
 
The purpose of this document is to offer a streamlined approach to developing a cybersecurity 
program for NSF funded projects including Large Facility (LFs), Major Research Equipment and 
Facilities Construction (MREFCs), and Cyberinfrastructure (CI) projects. This guide was developed for 
projects of considerable size but smaller projects will also benefit from following the concepts 
contained within this document. For smaller projects or those with fewer resources, some 
concessions will need to be made but the overall cybersecurity planning guidance can be applied to 
projects big and small. This guide has been developed to address the cybersecurity requirements 
outlined in the NSF Cooperative Agreements: CA-FATC LF Article 56 or CA-FATC FFRDC Article 59 , as 2
well as the increasing trend for information security planning at the grant proposal stage. We will 
review these requirements in more detail in the “Building a Cybersecurity Plan” section of this guide. 
 
The development of this guide was influenced by a variety of commonly available publications 
related to risk mitigation and cybersecurity planning including the following. 
● NIST Special Publications 800 Series  3
● NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publications  4
● NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity  5
● NRECA / Cooperative Research Network Smart Grid Demonstration Project “Guide to 
Developing a Cyber Security and Risk Mitigation Plan”  6
 
This document is tailored for an NSF-funded project serving the scientific community and includes 
guidance on cybersecurity challenges faced by those projects (regarding, e.g., scientific data, 
instruments, the distributed nature of science communities). Aspects related to that tailoring are 
based on the experience of the authors working in cybersecurity for a number of NSF and other 
federally funded science projects.  
Using	This	Guide	
Section 1 of this document is intended to provide a step-by-step process for developing a risk-based 
operational cybersecurity program to a reader who has a moderate to advanced understanding of 
information technology, but who may be relatively new to information security. Thus, this reader 
2 http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/cafatc/cafatc_lf212.pdf 
3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html 
4 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html 
5 http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/  
6 https://groups.cooperative.com/smartgriddemo/public/CyberSecurity/Documents/CyberSecurityGuideforanElect
ricCooperativeV11-2.pdf 
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may be a project's principal investigator and/or an IT specialist working for the project. For areas that 
are outside the readers’ knowledge, consultation with other members of the project and other 
sources of cybersecurity-relevant expertise (e.g., campus information security office) should be 
considered. Regardless, selecting key members of the project and including them in the planning 
process is recommended. The effort needed to complete each section of the guide will vary on the 
complexity of the project environment and resources available for the planning process. 
 
Section 2 provides introductory information, recommendations, and resources on a variety of special 
topics in information security. Many covered topics are relevant to any operational cybersecurity 
program (e.g., access controls), but the content is written and selected with NSF projects in mind and 
highlights a number of areas of particular relevance or interest. 
 
Throughout the guide, you will find a number of green Getting Started boxes, highlighting templated 
policies and tools. These templates are provided to help clarify concepts and assist projects in 
kickstarting their programs. At the same time, we strongly encourage projects to take ownership of 
the content, and make sure resulting policies meet their needs. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
These	blocks	highlight	templates	for	the	policies	and	other	
documents	discussed	in	this	guide.	Copying	and	editing	these	
templates	to	customize	for	your	project’s	individual	needs	is	an	
easy	way	to	get	started	with	needed	documentation,	or	formalize	
what	you	may	already	have	documented.	
 
Blue boxes serve to provide brief “Spotlights on Science,” highlighting content of special relevance 
to the science community. 
 
Spotlight on Science:  
 
Spotlight	on	Science	blocks	expand	on	the	topic	at	hand	with	tips	
or	other	guidance	relevant	to	the	needs	of	science	projects.	
 
Cybersecurity planning and program implementation is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor. We hope that 
both the templates and the notes on doing cybersecurity in the science world will aid in addressing 
your project’s specific needs. We strongly encourage the inclusion of all stakeholders and risk 
owners in any planning process.  
	
	
	
6 
	 
1	The	Process:	Establishing	and	Maintaining	a	Program	
1.1	Establishing	a	Cybersecurity	Program	
1.1.1	What	is	a	“Cybersecurity	Program?”	
A cybersecurity program is a structured approach to develop, implement, and maintain an 
organizational environment conducive to appropriate information security and levels of 
information-related risk. Cybersecurity programs generally include ongoing activities to address 
relevant policies and procedures, technologies, mitigations, and training and awareness activities. A 
cybersecurity program is scoped to the key information assets, resources, and lifespan of 
organizations. 
 
There exists no single authoritative approach or framework to developing and implementing a 
cybersecurity program, and we suggest projects consider a broad set of core tools (best practices, risk 
assessment, and program frameworks/maturity models), to inform a range of programmatic 
processes from establishing a program to evaluating and refining a program. 
 
Cybersecurity Program Processes and Core Tools  
 
 
 
These tools and processes are aimed at protecting information assets. Information assets (or just 
“assets”), as we refer to them in this guide, are valuable and/or sensitive organizational information 
and information systems. A cybersecurity program seeks to protect these assets from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide for the 
information security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (i.e., the “CIA” triad).  “A 7
7 See, 44 U.S.C. 3542(b), Available: 
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loss of information security” is synonymous with the “unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction of information assets.”  
 
Of course, there are a variety of ways to characterize the elements or components of a 
comprehensive cybersecurity program. Science projects may have security requirements handed 
down directly from a funding organization or other stakeholders of the system, or may fall under 
legal or regulatory regimes that dictate all or some of these components. NSF has the following 
highlighted security requirements for Large Facilities and FFRDCs, and has increasingly been 
including information security planning requirements at the grant writing stage.  
 
CA-FATC LF Article 56 and CA-FATC FFRDC Article 59  8
 
Security for all information technology (IT) systems employed in the performance of this award, 
including equipment and information, is the awardee’s responsibility. Within a time mutually 
agreed upon by the awardee and the cognizant NSF Program Officer, the awardee shall provide a 
written Summary of the policies, procedures, and practices employed by the awardee’s 
organization as part of the organization’s IT security program, in place or planned, to protect 
research and education activities in support of the award.  
  
The Summary shall describe the information security program appropriate for the project  
including, but not limited to: roles and responsibilities, risk assessment, technical safeguards, 
administrative safeguards, physical safeguards, policies and procedures, awareness and training, 
and notification procedures in the event of a cyber-security breach. The Summary shall include the 
institution’s evaluation criteria that will measure the successful implementation of the IT Security 
Program. In addition, the Summary shall address appropriate security measures required of all 
subawardees, subcontractors, researchers and others who will have access to the systems 
employed in support of this award.  
  
The Summary will be the basis of a dialogue which NSF will have with the awardee, directly or 
through community meetings. Discussions will address a number of topics, such as, but not limited 
to, evolving security concerns and concomitant cyber-security policy and procedures within the 
government and at awardees' institutions, available education and training activities in 
cyber-security, and coordination activities among NSF awardees.  
	
1.1.2	Utilizing	a	Risk-Based	Approach	to	Information	Security	
Risk management refers to a coordinated set of activities and methods that are used to direct an 
organization and to understand and respond to adverse events that can affect its ability to achieve its 
objectives.  As such, a risk management approach provides a disciplined and structured process that 9
integrates information security and broader risk management activities.   10
 
Cybersecurity planning and programs are often components of broader risk management activities 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title44/pdf/USCODE-2011-title44-chap35-subchapIII-sec3542.pdf 
8 http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/cafatc/cafatc_lf212.pdf 
9 http://www.praxiom.com/iso-31000-terms.htm 
10 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-final.pdf 
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within an organization, or may in fact introduce an organization to formal risk management practices. 
Risk management provides a means for prioritizing and sharing information about the security risks 
to an information technology (IT) infrastructure. Projects may choose to handle information security 
risks in different ways, including mitigating the risk, transferring the risk, avoiding the risk, or 
accepting the risk.  In the information security space, organizations almost always must accept some 11
de facto residual risk -- the risk that remains after mitigations are implemented. 
 
In addition to being required of some NSF projects (per the above-cited terms), risk-based 
approaches are particularly appropriate for information security and the science field for a variety of 
reasons: 
 
● Pure compliance regimes (i.e., sets of highly specified rules) are inappropriate in the 
information security domain, particularly at this time, and particularly for operational 
cybersecurity programs which much address an expansive range of information-related risks. 
The state of the art and science around information security is changing rapidly, as are the 
threats. Programs are best tailored to the projects’ information assets and constraints. 
Risk-based approaches allow organizations to forge ahead flexibly. 
● Risk-based approaches may be particularly well-suited for organizations with limited 
resources and time. Compliance regimes (even ones that include risk-based processes, e.g., 
HIPAA) can be particularly burdensome when applied to organizations with limited 
resources. Risk-based approaches universally embrace the idea that tough decisions have to 
be made, and that risk management cannot and does not mean that all risk is avoided or 
stamped out.  
● Science projects may have limited ability to transfer risk via insurance. Insurance plays a huge 
role in addressing risk at scale in our society. However, the ‘cyber insurance’ industry is only 
beginning to take off, and -- even if it were readily negotiable for science projects via parent 
institutions and the like -- insurance cannot remedy many of the most serious cyber-based 
losses to science projects. No amount of money can bring back one-of-a-kind scientific data, 
lost opportunities for discovery, or reputation within the science community. 
 
However, risk-based approaches are not without their challenges. They do require time, effort, 
familiarity with a set of concepts and tools, organizational buy-in, and the involvement of project 
leadership. One of the purposes of this guide is to provide a useable ‘crash course’ in a relatively 
agile risk-based approach to information security. 
1.1.3	The	Role	of	Project	Leadership		
Governance and project leadership’s role in a cybersecurity program is crucial. As information and 
information systems become increasingly critical to our economies, research, social lives, and 
national security -- and the number and diversity of information security threats grows -- it has 
become increasingly clear that organizational leadership must be involved in understanding and 
managing information security risks, and fine-tuning resource allocation.  
 
The individual tasked with the cybersecurity program’s oversight must have clear authority to 
develop and implement the needed security policies and practices. We recommend explicitly 
naming an Information Security Officer (ISO), whether that individual is already in a leadership role 
11 http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf, at p.5 
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in the project (e.g., a Principal Investigator), a key IT manager, or a team member with cybersecurity 
expertise. See, Section 1.1.6 below and the Master Information Security Policies and Procedures 
template, Section 2 “Roles and Responsibilities.” 
1.1.4	Project	Constraints	and	Lifespan	
All organizations face constraints on the time, money, and expertise they can bring to bear on 
information security. NSF projects, even very large, long-lived ones, may face particularly stark 
constraints when considering the feasible scope and depth of a cybersecurity program. Unlike a long 
lived governmental entity or well-established commercial enterprise, projects usually have 
relatively short lifespans and/or limited ability to predict the future of funding availability beyond a 
particular funding period. Moreover, projects may or may not have the funding to attract and hire 
experienced, dedicated security personnel. Because cybersecurity programs do not simply spring 
into existence, requiring both time and effort evolve and mature, these constraints require project 
leadership to make strategic, pragmatic decisions about where to concentrate. 
1.1.5	Making	Use	of	External	Resources	and	Partners	
Sound leadership also means making use of available resources. NSF projects, not unlike other 
organizations, must make a number of decisions about what aspects of the program can be designed 
and implemented in-house, and when to reach out for assistance or outsource. Some activities may 
be obvious ‘DIY’ fodder (cataloging assets, training personnel on the project’s own policies), and 
others scream out for help (documenting legal requirements in case of a breach of personal data).  
 
When developing a cybersecurity program there are more sources of assistance available than one 
might realize. The first place a project can look is at their own institution’s departmental resources. 
The department might have IT staff available to help with developing or maintaining a security 
program. This same staff might have experience with administration and management of systems. 
Your project might be able to leverage existing policies and procedures (e.g., incident response, 
change management). See what the department has available and make use of it. 
 
Beyond the department is the institution's campus IT or information security office. Most campuses 
have some type of cybersecurity program in place and you should be able to leverage it. This 
resource may be able to help with the following. 
 
● Assistance with risk assessments 
● Security training 
● Security services (e.g., monitoring, firewalling) 
● Forensic services 
● Knowledge of relevant laws and regulations (e.g., FERPA, HIPAA, state data breach and data 
retention statutes) 
 
Outside of campus resources available to a project, there is the NSF CI community at large.  
 
Leverage the NSF Community 
● Experiences and practices of other CI projects 
● See, http://trustedci.org/useful-links/  
● Ask other CI projects directly and build relationships 
10 
	 
 
CTSC (Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure)  12
● Engagements and advice 
● More about this in the next Unit 
 
Bro Center of Expertise  13
● Network security and monitoring 
	
1.1.6	Information	Security	Policies	and	Procedures	
Developing, implementing, and maintaining a cybersecurity program inevitably involves planning 
and documentation, most commonly in the form of policies and procedures. In fact, many of the 
“controls” we discuss in later sections are embodied and communicated directly through the written 
word. As a formative policy step, we recommend developing a “Master Information Security Policy & 
Procedures” (MISPP) document that provides (a) a brief, broad overview of the project and the 
importance of information security to the project, (b) a summary of roles and responsibilities, 
including naming the Information Security Officer, (c) an organized list and description of other, 
special purpose organizational information security policy documents (e.g., Data Classification Policy; 
Incident Response Procedures), and (d) the core procedures for developing, implementing, and 
maintaining the program. This master document forms the core of the program. A template MISPP is 
included as an appendix to this guide. Throughout this guide, we will refer back to the MISPP and 
other special purpose policy and procedure documents you may need to develop. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
If	your	project	or	organization	doesn’t	yet	have	a	high-level	/	
master	information	security	policy	written,	consider	starting	with	
the	Master	Information	Security	Policy	&	Procedures	
Template.	You	can	easily	copy	the	Google	Doc	and	edit	it	to	create	
a	policy	that	fits	your	specific	situation,	or	just	borrow	the	
individual	sections	needed	to	flesh	out	a	policy	already	begun.	
 
1.2	Identifying	Information	Assets	
Information assets sit at the heart of CTSC’s risk-based approach to information security. Identifying, 
understanding, and documenting those assets is a natural early step and critical in linking together 
the tools and processes that make a program work. 
 
 
 
12 http://trustedci.org/ 
13 http://www.bro.org/nsf/  
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1.2.1	Defining	“Information	Assets”	
We define information assets as valuable and/or sensitive organizational information and 
information systems. 
Information is any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, data, 
or opinions in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, 
cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual.  14
An information system is a discrete set of information and related resources (such as 
people, equipment, and information technology) organized for the collection, 
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, and/or disposition of 
information.  15
While these definitions are very broad, they provide a useful, simple lens for viewing the scope of 
assets requiring protection.  
Assets have a basic level of organizational value and/or sensitivity. These qualities of value and 
sensitivity are key factors to consider in analyzing the anticipated impact of security incidents. Of 
course, value may be related to the monetary value of an asset; but it can mean much more. A 
science project’s most valuable assets may well be those most critical to the project’s science 
mission, regardless of fungibility. “Sensitive” describes information and information systems for 
which unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction could negatively 
impact organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations or 
stakeholders. Many organizational assets are both valuable and sensitive; these terms are not 
mutually exclusive. Used together, these terms capture the scope of an organization’s basis for 
utilizing resources to protect information assets. 
Example Information Assets 
	 Valuable	 Sensitive	
Information	 Research	data	 Regulated	personal	information	
Information	
Systems	
Telescope	 SCADA	
 
We distinguish assets from the broader organizational interests (e.g., science mission, legal property 
interests, continuity of operations, reputation/goodwill, safety and well-being of individuals, other 
organizations and stakeholders) that security efforts assist in protecting. While these broader 
interests form the foundation for why we protect information assets, focusing on the assets 
themselves allows the cybersecurity program to clarify its scope, producing useful units of analysis 
for risk assessment and control selection. 
14 See, National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009, Apr. 2010. 
15 See, 44 U.S.C. 3502 
12 
	 
1.2.2	Documenting	the	Asset	Environment	
A complete and accurate information asset inventory is one of the most powerful tools available to 
the information security officer. Every other step in the process of creating a healthy cybersecurity 
program begins with knowing what information and information systems are to be secured. Assets 
that haven’t been assigned to someone to maintain are prone to neglect. Personnel turnover can 
dramatically reduce the effectiveness of a cybersecurity program if there is no way to bring new 
personnel up to speed on what the environment looks like. 
Getting Started: 
 
The	Information	Asset	Inventory	Template	provides	a	lightweight	
framework	for	efficiently	identifying	and	characterizing	both	
information	and	information	systems.	
 
The included template is packed with tips; here we offer a couple of general recommendations.  
 
First, we find it generally advisable to start the inventory process with information, as opposed to 
information systems. The mobility, and easy reproducibility, of information (particularly digital 
information) means that data flows can reveal the full expanse of a distributed information 
ecosystem. Tracking the information, and constructing data flows or maps, will help reveal many of 
the relevant systems, and potential points of compromise. 
 
Second, to make inventories usable, we often must define assets at various levels of abstraction. 
Probably all projects have IT infrastructure as an asset, and one can often select well established best 
practice controls for IT infrastructure. Similarly, it may be practically necessary to characterize types 
or classes of information (e.g., “sensitive email communications” or “personal information on 
research data participants”) and information systems (e.g., “MacX GPSr-based 1pps timers ” or 
“personnel personal mobile devices”) rather than more discrete units. At the same time, many NSF 
projects will have some very specific and even unique assets warranting closer analysis (e.g., a 
special instrument array; a specific data set). Our template attempts to strike a balance. 
1.2.3	Security	Objectives	for	Information	Assets	
A natural step during asset documentation is to go one step further to consider the security 
objectives for these assets. The “CIA” triad is a commonly recognized set of concepts from 
NIST/FISMA.  By determining and documenting the needs for confidentiality, integrity, and/or 16
availability for an asset or set of assets, projects can jumpstart the process of prioritizing effort and 
communicating about the types of projections needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 See, FIPS Publication 199 and 44 U.S.C. 3542(b), Available: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title44/pdf/USCODE-2011-title44-chap35-subchapIII-sec3542.pdf 
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Spotlight on Science: Integrity and Availability 
 
In	many	settings,	confidentiality	is	king,	however	integrity	and	
availability	often	take	center	stage	in	science.	The	integrity	of	
research	data	and	the	availability	of	scientific	instruments	can	be	
critical	to	the	science	mission.	
 
Confidentiality  Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means 
for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. A loss of 
confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information. 
Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, including 
ensuring information authenticity. A loss of integrity includes the unauthorized 
modification or destruction of information, and the unauthorized control of an 
information system.  
Availability Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of assets. A loss of availability is 
the disruption of access to or use of an asset. 
 
1.2.4	Utilizing	Your	Documentation	
An information asset inventory becomes a primary source for the process of selecting baseline 
controls (discussed in Section 1.3), as well as in conducting asset-based risk assessments (discussed 
in Section 1.4), as well as feeding into policy development (e.g., access control policies, see 2.1.1; 
information classification policies, see 2.2.6). In addition to being an indispensable part of 
cybersecurity program planning, the information asset inventory can aid in measuring and improving 
the program.  Tracking the number and complexity of information assets being secured allows one to 
predict what resources will be needed for information security going forward. Finding a way to 
improve security around one type of asset or interaction provides knowledge that can be applied to 
others if one has clear documentation of what those assets are and how they interact. 
1.3	Selecting	&	Implementing	Baseline	Controls	
Controls or mitigations are the management, operational, and technical safeguards or 
countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and/or availability of information assets. We use “controls” and “mitigations” more-or-less 
interchangeably. 
 
In this section, we emphasize the selection of baseline controls, because control development and 
selection (and, certainly, implementation) are ongoing and recurring processes in a risk-based 
cybersecurity program. However, the control selection process must begin somewhere, and a science 
project might take any one or a combination of several approaches for control selection. Consider the 
following options: 
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1. Utilize a cybersecurity maturity model (see, Section 1.5 below) or the NIST Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity  to identify best practices and common 17
controls relevant to your program and information assets. While these frameworks can be 
very useful evaluation tools, they also provide substantial guidance regarding widely 
accepted controls, and can assist a great deal in planning a comprehensive program.  
2. Go to NIST SP 800-53 rev 4.  NIST tackles security control baselines head-on and with a great 18
deal of sophistication (Section 3.1), and provides an extensive catalog of controls (Appendix 
F). 
3. Dive directly into best practices documents designed to get you up to speed on common and 
critical security controls. CTSC’s Securing Commodity IT in Scientific CI Projects  is one such 19
document. SANS has produced a publicly-available resource, Critical Security Controls.  20
Review the DISA STIGs for specific technical control implementation on most operating 
systems and software.   21
4. Use the results of a quick or targeted risk assessment to identify the most dire threats to your 
most critical assets. 
5. Use the results of a comprehensive risk assessment to tailor control selection to your 
particular project needs. 
 
The pragmatic choice depends on the stage and lifespan of your project, as well as available 
resources. A newly funded project may or may not have sufficient ability to characterize its 
information security environment in order to rely heavily on risk assessments or even select specific 
technical controls. At the same time, the project may have the outlook and time to lay out a 
comprehensive vision of its cybersecurity program from a more top-down perspective. An existing 
project, near or in an operational state, may need to kickstart its program quickly, identifying critical 
risks and relevant best practices prior to using resources to flesh out and tailor the program. 
 
Whether or not your baseline controls are informed directly by a risk assessment, we strongly 
recommend the identification and utilization of established best practices whenever and wherever 
they can be found. While information security is a quickly evolving field, and scientific CI projects 
may well face unique or challenging risk management decisions, there is also a great deal of solid 
best practice available, particularly around commodity IT and general best practices as we discuss 
throughout this guide. Section 2 of this guide is focused on providing concise discussions, resources, 
and template policies for best practices around a number of information security domains. 
 
Like many of the processes discussed in this guide, control selection may benefit from eliciting help 
from security experts, peers, and available resources. Often, campus IT resources will be available to 
discuss this topic. CTSC is also available to aid with control decisions.  
	
	
17 http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/  
18 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html 
19 http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/commodityIT 
20 http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls  
21 http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/a-z.html 
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1.4	The	Role	of	Risk	Assessment	
1.4.1	A	Flexible	Input	into	Risk	Management	Processes	
Risk assessments comprise a key component of most, if not all, risk-based approaches to information 
security. In most cases, risk assessments are used to identify, estimate, and organize threats to an 
entity. Their purpose is to inform decision makers and support broader risk management processes, 
particularly in weighing the relative estimated levels of risk associated with various potential 
adverse events. They serve as a means not only to identify the most likely and impactful 
cybersecurity threats, but to assist in the process of allocating scarce resources to mitigate those 
risks. 
 
There is no single “right way” to conduct a risk assessment. Risk assessments can vary both in 
assessment approach (e.g., qualitative, semi-quantitative) and orientation or starting point (e.g., 
asset/impact-oriented analysis, vulnerability-oriented analysis). NIST Special Publication 800-30 rev 1
 provides a comprehensive overview of an approach to risk assessment, as well as a great deal of 22
context on the variety of choices that need to be made regarding how to approach the process. 
Importantly, risk assessment can be scoped broadly (e.g., to assess all the information 
security-related risk to a project) or more narrowly (e.g., to analyze the risk to a mission critical 
asset). Moreover, a project’s approach to risk assessment may necessarily vary depending on where 
the project is in its lifespan. For instance, a newly funded multi-year project may not be 
well-positioned to conduct an extensive risk assessment, and may instead turn its attention to 
establishing information security best practices, implementing well-established controls, and 
fleshing out policy as the project ramps up. A well-established project may need to focus efforts on 
identifying its most valuable and sensitive assets and its most critical threats in order to rapidly 
improve its program. A more mature project and cybersecurity program may utilize a detailed risk 
assessment to assess the effectiveness of existing controls, and fine tune the program. 
 
Risk assessment has some fairly intuitive conceptual underpinnings, but the process can be time 
consuming and truly challenging. The benefits of structured, careful risk assessments include the 
following: 
 
● A risk assessment can assist a project in identifying gaps in a security program. 
● The resulting documentation becomes a useful communication and discussion tool that can 
be validated, updated, and reused. 
● More comprehensive approaches can help fine-tune programs, and provide a basis for 
evaluating control effectiveness. 
 
The risk assessment approach we describe in the following subsections is designed to introduce core 
concepts and processes that can be utilized at varying levels of scope and sophistication depending 
on a project’s needs. In CTSC, we generally recommend an asset-based approach to risk assessment, 
where analysis of threats and mitigations flow from articulation of the project’s information assets 
(i.e., information and information systems). 
 
 
 
22 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30-rev1/sp800_30_r1.pdf 
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It is in the context of a risk assessment where nearly every risk-based approach uses some variation 
of the following equation to calculate and compare adverse risk events: 
 
Impact	x	Likelihood	=	Risk	
 
If we can scope and characterize a threat event, estimate the likelihood of that event occurring, and 
the potential negative impact if it does, we have some useful gauge of the magnitude of the risk. 
Unfortunately, the usable simplicity of these concepts stops there if you intend to take a systematic 
approach to assessing information security risks. To assist with the process, we’ve developed a Risk 
Assessment Table  for readers to copy and utilize, as well as modify to their needs. This table 23
supports a semi-quantitative approach to risk assessment. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
View	our	Risk	Assessment	Table,	including	the	sample	entries	
and	the	comparative	residual	and	inherent	risk	levels.	We’ll	return	
to	this	tool	throughout	the	next	few	subsections.	
 
In the next several subsections, we introduce processes, concepts, and tips for conducting risk 
assessments. However, a few tips are overarching: 
 
● Be careful and consistent in how you operationalize and apply each concept and scale. 
● Be efficient where possible. Risk assessments are meant to produce actionable input into 
decision processes. 
● Understand that this is an estimation process regarding possible future events. Even if your 
risk assessment is based on rock solid historical data, this is still a predictive process with 
uncertainty.  
● Don’t be afraid to solicit help and advice. 
1.4.2	Characterizing	Risks:	Threats,	Vulnerabilities,	and	Attack	Surfaces	
In Section 1.3, we highlighted the importance of knowing and documenting your information assets. 
That foundation feeds directly into the risk assessment process. As you’ve seen in the Risk 
Assessment Table, information assets represent the highest level organizer of the risk assessment 
process. We suggest an asset-based approach to risk assessment, particularly for new, distributed, or 
rapidly changing projects where a comprehensive understanding of the full range of assets may be 
distributed across a number of people, and through multiple documents.  
 
Having identified your information assets, the next step in the risk assessment process is to 
characterize the risk to those assets. We generally characterize these risks in terms of “threats,” 
defining that term quite broadly: 
 
A “threat” is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact             
23 The Risk Assessment Table was based in part on Logic Manager’s enterprise risk management-focused risk 
assessment table, CTSC’s specific asset-based approach to risk assessment, as well as core concepts from the 
NIST Special Publication series. 
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organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation),        
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations and/or stakeholders through        
an information system via a loss of information security.  
 
As such, threats include potential circumstances or events resulting from accidental, negligent, 
reckless, and malicious actions, as well as natural events -- i.e., both “adversarial” and 
“non-adversarial threats.” Threats often can be described in terms of a threat source (e.g., an actor) 
and the action taken against (and/or utilizing) an information asset. For example, an employee 
inappropriately shares sensitive communications. This approach is similar to taking a “root cause” 
approach to characterizing risks, a best practice designed to assist risk managers in conceptually 
separating key causal events from their ill effects. 
 
One of the great challenges of characterizing threats to an asset is capturing the full number and 
scope of threats. Consider resources such as the catalogue of threat events in NIST SP 800-30 
(Appendix E), reaching out to experienced information security personnel, and participating in 
information sharing groups to build your institutional knowledge of information security threats. 
Another challenge is scoping your descriptions of threats. Our best advice is that this simply takes 
some practice, and -- ultimately -- consistency in an approach.  
 
CTSC defines a “vulnerability” as a weakness in an information system that warrants mitigation.” 
Again, this is a quite broad definition. Some cybersecurity risk assessment approaches suggest that a 
threat always maps to a vulnerability. Our approach is less constrained, and accounts for attack 
surfaces that may not be fairly described as “weaknesses” or “gaps.” Attack surfaces are the portions 
or components of an information system through which the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction of information assets may take place. A single asset (e.g., 
raw research data collected by a specialized instrument) may be susceptible to attack via multiple 
surfaces. 
1.4.3	Estimating	Impact	
Impact refers to the estimated potential magnitude of harm to organizational interests (e.g., science 
mission, property, operations, reputation/goodwill, safety and well-being of individuals, other 
organizations and stakeholders) due to an unmitigated loss of information security.  
 
In using the Risk Assessment Table, provide impact estimations for each we suggest operationalizing 
impact along a 5 point scale, but similar systems use a range of three point to 10 point scales. 
Regardless of the scale you use, it is critical that the each value be well defined and well understood 
by those applying the ratings. Consistent application is key.  
 
In estimating impact, the following factors should be considered where applicable: 
● Asset value 
● Asset sensitivity 
● Nature of the interest and type of resultant harm flowing from a loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, and/or availability (e.g., loss of human life, damage to reputation, inconvenience to 
end users) 
● Scope of resultant harm across time (including length of time), and number and type of 
stakeholders 
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● The transaction or response costs associated with handling the incident 
● The knowledge, confidence and expertise of the those performing the estimation 
1.4.4	Estimating	Likelihood	
Likelihood is an estimation of the probability of the occurrence of a security incident, where a 
security incident is defined as a threat that has manifested itself in such a way as to warrant a 
response due to an imminent or actual loss of information security. Therefore, incidents and 
likelihood estimates encompass a range of events, from successful, harmful attacks to attempts or 
near-misses where response is warranted. 
 
Once again, estimating the likelihood of particular information security incidents is a multifactor 
affair. While historical evidence, experience, and threat intelligence can help, estimating likelihood 
can be a very subjective and challenging activity. Much more than impact, this takes insight into 
what’s happening “in the wild.” 
 
In estimating likelihood, the following factors should be considered where applicable: 
 
● Anticipated frequency of the adverse event occurring 
● Motivation, knowledge, and capabilities of potential threat sources 
● Specifics of any relevant vulnerabilities 
● The knowledge, confidence, and expertise of the those performing the estimation 
 
The first factor, frequency, can be particularly helpful in operationalizing likelihood. In the Risk 
Assessment Table, we suggest using a 5 point scale. However, it is advisable to calibrate your scale to 
specific frequency ranges. For example, you may wish to define “Very Infrequent” as 
one-incident-per-year. Again, consistency is key. Operationalize the scale clearly and in terms that 
make sense for your project. 
 
Spotlight on Science: No Uninteresting Targets 
 
Science	projects	may	feel	that	they	“aren’t	interesting	enough	
targets”	for	computer	criminals.	Unfortunately,	merely	having	a	
mobile	computing	device	and/or	an	internet	connection	is	enough	
to	make	anyone	a	target.	Many	attackers	are	simply	thrill-	or	
reputation-seeking	or	looking	to	steal	resources	so	there	doesn’t	
have	to	be	a	monetary	incentive	at	play.	Many	compromises	don’t	
involve	a	human	actively	targeting	systems	to	begin	with.	There	
are	many	automation	tools	that	may	be	dispatched	to	attack	
system	after	system	and	simply	“call	home”	when	something	has	
been	penetrated.	
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1.4.5	Estimating	Control	Effectiveness	and	Residual	Risk	
Using the Risk Assessment Table, your ratings of impact and likelihood produce an estimate of 
inherent risk level -- that is, the level of risk associated with an unmitigated security incident coming 
to pass. If current controls are in place to prevent, detect, contain, respond to, and/or otherwise 
recover from the incident, this is your opportunity to account for the effectiveness of these controls.  
 
Again, we use a 5 point scale, with “1” denoting ineffective or non-existent controls and “5” denoting 
extremely effective controls. The rating is used to reduce the inherent risk (impact x likelihood) 
according to the following formula: 
 
r	=	n	×	(	6	-	c	)	
							5	
 
In this equation, n = inherent risk (i.e., impact × likelihood), and c = control effectiveness.  The 
resultant number, r, is an estimation of residual risk -- i.e., the level of risk associated with a threat 
taking into account the effectiveness of existing controls. 
 
While there exist other reasonable formulas to estimate residual risk, we chose this one with the 
following goals in mind: 
 
● Keep the Impact (i), Likelihood (l), and Control Effectiveness (c) on the same simple 5-point 
scale. 
● Keep the Inherent Risk (n) and Residual Risk (r) on the same simple 25-point  scale. 24
● Ensure that Residual Risk (r) scales reasonably relative to Control Effectiveness (c), rather 
than dropping off sharply in response to relatively ineffective or incomplete controls. 
 
Records of incidents, active testing, as well as a strong understanding of mitigation costs are 
warranted to assess the effectiveness of each control in mitigating a particular risk. 
1.4.6	Utilizing	the	Results	of	Risk	Assessments	
As discussed earlier, risk assessment -- and particularly the semi-quantitative assessments indicated 
in the Risk Assessment Table -- serve, first and foremost, as an input into decision making processes. 
Specifically, they assist in matching available effort and resources to feasible threats in order to 
achieve acceptable levels of risk. Residual risk levels may be informative in their own right, but they 
are particularly meaningful in comparison with one another. Moreover, regardless of the levels of 
residual risk, the next step is critical and not predetermined by any math: Is further mitigation 
warranted? The goal is to achieve acceptable levels of risk and that necessarily means selectively 
accepting residual risk, and prioritizing effort and resources. Regardless of who conducted the risk 
assessment up through the calculation of residual risk levels, the results warrant the attention of the 
project’s ISO and/or leadership, both to understand the results and determine next steps. 
	
24 They aren’t exactly the same. On the Risk Assessment Table template, Inherent Risk is a 1-25 scale and Residual 
Risk a 0-25 scale. This simply a result of rounding to whole numbers in Google Docs. 
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1.5	Evaluating	the	Program	
Evaluating a cybersecurity program means more than conducting risk assessments or evaluating the 
effectiveness of existing controls. Additionally, in most projects, the network will continually be 
expanded and updated, its components changed, and its software applications replaced or updated 
with newer versions. Also, personnel changes will occur and security policies are likely to evolve 
over time. These changes mean that new risks will surface and risks previously mitigated may again 
become a concern. Thus, the risk management process is ongoing, and the same basic steps above 
can be applied. 
 
Spotlight on Science: Getting Help with Evaluation 
 
Part	of	CTSC’s	mission	is	to	help	NSF	projects	evaluate	and	improve	
their	cybersecurity	programs.	We	can	also	help	you	investigate	and	
answer	questions	about	specific	security	areas	where	your	project	
needs	help	filling	gaps.	
 
1.5.1	Program	Maturity	and	Metrics	
The information security community and policy makers are taking an increasing interest in 
approaches and methods for evaluating cybersecurity programs. This interest goes beyond 
compliance regimes, extending to the exploration of different metrics (e.g., outcome versus process 
metrics) and the proliferation of cybersecurity maturity models.  
 
Just as recent years have seen a massive increase in the number, scale, and visibility of cybersecurity 
incidents and increasing awareness and understanding of the need for systematic defense, there is 
also a growing appreciation that (a) cybersecurity is not a one-size-fits-all affair and (b) few if any 
organizations, even those with robust programs, can expect to operate free of security incidents. As 
such, the current trend is toward process metrics and evaluation models aligned with 
risk-management practices. 
 
Cybersecurity maturity models are commonly characterized by organized approaches to evaluating 
cybersecurity programs across security domains and practices, and maturity that describe increasing 
sophistication of cybersecurity practices (e.g., Ad Hoc, Defined, Managed, Optimized, Adaptive ). 25
Applying maturity models or the “Implementation Tiers” of NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity not only gives an organization insight into the current state of its 
program, but can assist in identifying a target state and roadmap. 
 
More generally, benefits of implementing evaluation processes include increased accountability, 
increased program effectiveness, and input into resource allocation. 
 
 
 
25 http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Cyber-Operations-Maturity-Framework-viewpoint.pdf See Appendix B on 
p.16. 
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We recommend a few general “first steps” in considering methods to evaluate your information 
security program: 
 
1. Make certain you are aware of and meet any specific legal or contractual compliance 
requirements. These may effectively set the baseline expectations for your program. 
2. Ensure that you plan for and implement periodic internal evaluations of the cybersecurity 
program. (We recommend documenting these processes in your Master Information Security 
Policies and Procedures  or other similar, core policy or plan.) While these cyclical processes 26
will involve risk assessments, new threats, and the evaluation of specific controls, they can 
also look at the program holistically, as well as prepare you for external reviews.  
3. Communicate with your funding agency, home institutions, and colleagues about 
performance measurement practices and expectations. CI projects have been known to 
conduct peer assessments of security programs as a low cost way to get outside input, and 
compare notes. 
4. Explore some of the tools and maturity models listed below.  
a. NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity  27
b. NIST Special Publication 800-55 rev 1, Performance Measurement Guide for 
Information Security  28
c. Higher Education Information Security Council (HEISC) Information Security Program 
Assessment Tool  29
d. CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT-RMM)  30
e. Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2)  31
f. Booz Allen’s Cyber Operations Maturity Framework  32
5. Consider whether an external organization can help with an assessment of your program. 
External peer or expert reviews can provide added objectivity, as well as fresh perspectives. 
	
26 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sfHvJ2-3ELksKQ2yHcpXMqdpK8J87roFCL2LjyC5iWQ/edit 
27 http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/ 
28 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-55-Rev1/SP800-55-rev1.pdf 
29 http://www.educause.edu/library/resources/information-security-program-assessment-tool 
30 http://www.cert.org/resil ience/products-services/cert-rmm/index.cfm 
31 http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/02/f7/ES-C2M2-v1-1-Feb2014.pdf 
32 http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Cyber-Operations-Maturity-Framework-viewpoint.pdf 
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2	Controls	and	Contexts		
2.1	Identity	and	Access	Management	
2.1.1	Access	Control	and	Privileges	
This section covers access control in general and applies it to information systems directly. Physical 
access control is covered in the “Physical Security” section. 
 
Access control is fundamental to information security, and represents an organization’s policies and 
practices around who has access to what information and information systems, the extent of that 
access (e.g., level of privilege), and when and under what conditions that access is granted and 
revoked. Access control policies and procedures can be simple or complex, and may be impacted by 
available technologies, project scale, and legal/regulatory requirements.  
 
Projects should pay particular attention to the management of privileged accounts, and access to 
sensitive information and information systems. While your organization will likely need to develop 
and adopt tailored policies, we offer a template Access Control Policy with ideas for what to include 
and how to structure it. We suggest an asset-based approach to laying out general policies on access 
control.  
 
Consider the following practices: 
● Remote root access should not be allowed across trust boundaries, and should be further 
restricted wherever possible.  
● Root access by users should be done in a manner that provides accountability to the user. 
● Services that are only to be accessed from within a trust boundary (e.g., only hosts on the 
same cluster) should have access restricted to those hosts only. Even if the service does not 
have a known vulnerability, it should be restricted only to the hosts/networks where it is 
needed. Where access is allowed across trust boundaries, a strong authentication mechanism 
should be used to authenticate hosts or users. For example, host based SSH authentication 
should be restricted to nodes within a cluster. 
● Monitoring gives the ability to detect problems and take the necessary actions to correct 
them. It can be used to discover the security holes opened intentionally by attackers or 
unintentionally such as disabled or unused services that may be enabled by mistake. While 
implementing a full Intrusion Detection/Prevention service is not a practical option for every 
project, some form of routine monitoring should be conducted. 
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Getting Started: 
 
You	may	use	the	Access	Control	Policy	Template	as	a	starting	
point	for	creating	and	documenting	your	project	or	organization’s	
policies.	Some	individual	assets	may	require	their	own	policies.	
The	Asset-Specific	Access	and	Privilege	Specification	
template	can	be	used	as	a	basis	for	these	more	specialized	
documents.	
 
When granting personnel access and privileges to information and information systems, the best 
practice is to grant the lowest level of access and privileges required for that person to do his or her 
job efficiently. This is often referred to as “least privilege.” 
 
Projects should consider both maintaining a list of all personnel, with a description of authorized 
access and privileges, and conducting a regular, periodic review of identity and access management 
components to ensure they are appropriately limited. Processes should be in place to remove access 
when personnel leave the project, are terminated, or no longer require access to certain information 
assets. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
The	Personnel	Exit	Checklist	is	broken	into	three	areas:	physical	
security,	revoking	system	access	and	administrative	concerns.	The	
checklist	can	be	used	to	record	task	completion,	the	initials	of	the	
responsible	staff	member,	date	and	a	notes	field.	
 
2.1.2	Passwords	and	Identity	Management	
Identity management (IdM) is a vast and critically important area of information security, and an area 
where scientific CI and collaborations have presented serious challenges and offered considerable 
innovation. IdM is fundamental to securing information and information systems, but equally central 
to enabling collaboration, accounting, attribution, and other functions that make 21st century science 
possible. We can’t begin to fully cover IdM in this document. CI projects’ IdM implementations may 
involve complex credentialing schemes, trust relationships among multiple organizations, 
institutions, and communities, the limitations of legacy systems,... the list goes on. However, most if 
not all projects still rely heavily on passwords.  
 
Password management practices and policies, particularly those around password length and 
complexity, are the subject of considerable debate. We believe the following recommendations, and 
the included Password Policy Template offer a good start at specifying a scientific CI password 
management implementation.  
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Our Password Policy Template was influenced a great deal by the SANS Password Policy , and the 33
work of the Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP) security and identity management teams. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
The	Password	Policy	Template	may	be	used	as	a	starting	point	
for	your	project’s	policy.	
 
Recommended practices: 
● Use strong authentication mechanisms (e.g., require strong, complex passwords, GSI, SSH 
keys, OTP) for services. Set a strong minimum standard for password strength for all project 
accounts.  
● Be sure you harmonize internal facing policies with the recommendations and requirements 
you place on external users (e.g., through an Acceptable Use Policy). 
● Ensure that your administrators and security personnel can react quickly to potential 
password compromises. 
● Clearly state and communicate policies on the protection of issued credentials. Everyone 
must play a role in protecting the secrets that give them access to project assets. See the 
Password Policy Template and Acceptable Use Template for more. Include password 
protection in your training and awareness efforts. 
● Ensure that, where passwords are transmitted across a network, they are encrypted. 
● Encourage the use of well-established password managers (e.g., LastPass, KeePassX, 
1Password, Dashlane), and informed practices on how to use them well.   34
● Implement common password checking and reject user-generated passwords that show up 
on the list. Some passwords and passphrases are considered weak not because they fail to 
meet length and complexity requirements, but because they are commonly used, or based 
on dictionary words, common phrases, famous quotes or a simple variant of either. We 
recommend the use of a common password library, such as the cracklib library, to perform 
such a check and reject common passwords. 
● A common mitigation against online brute force password attacks provides for account 
locking or IP blocking following a number of failed authentication attempts. There are 
variations on how to implement this, but implementing something is good practice. The 
account lockout threshold should be high enough that legitimate users do not accidentally 
lock their own accounts. Also, account lockouts can be used as a denial of service attack so 
blocking a specific IP address may be better than a complete account lock. 
● Carefully control access to privileged accounts and require accountability and higher security 
requirements for users who have privileged access. Consider increased minimum standards 
(e.g., increased character length requirements) for administrative/privileged accounts. Very 
large, random passwords are made feasible by contemporary password managers, and size 
dramatically increases resistance to certain types of attacks. 
33 http://www.sans.org/security-resources/policies/general/pdf/password-protection-policy  
34 We note that passphrase based systems can also produce strong results, with added benefits of memorability. 
Due to the relatively recent advent of passphrase practices and increasing util ity of encrypted password 
managers (in a world where many of us have 10’s if not 100’s of unique passwords) we focus on passwords, 
though passphrases can be particularly helpful in designing hard-to-crack, yet memorable mechanisms for 
accessing password manager accounts. 
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● When possible, use multifactor authentication mechanisms, particularly for privileged 
access. (Password + One Time Password or SSH Key + One Time Password). Multifactor 
authentication is becoming increasingly affordable and usable, and can have a dramatic 
positive impact on access risks.  
● Whenever a system may be administered by more than one individual, sudo should be used 
to delegate that ability so that the system can accurately log which user took each action. 
2.1.3	Enforce	Access	Control,	Monitoring,	and	Logging	
In order for an information system to be useful to users, it must be made available for access by 
users. An information system may have different components available to different sets of users. 
Configuring each component to allow a particular set of users is the challenge of "access control". 
Once a user has gained access to the system, activities should be monitored to make sure that the 
user does not perform unapproved actions. Additionally, all activity should be logged, ideally to a 
remote system, for possible auditing at a future time. 
 
System monitoring does not need to be strictly user-focused. Intrusion detection systems (e.g., 
OSSEC HIDS ) can monitor networks or hosts for malicious activities and alert system administrators 35
of potential policy violations. Vulnerability scanners (e.g., QualysGuard ) can be employed to 36
routinely probe the system for weakness and alert system administrators of possible configuration 
problems. Configuration management utilities (e.g., Puppet ) can monitor crucial system 37
configuration files and revert to a known good state. Log analysis tools (e.g., logwatch) can scan 
system logs and issue reports of past activities of interest. Any system design should consider all of 
these components to help defend against malicious activities. 
 
Resources: 
● NIST 7316 Assessment of Access Control Systems  38
● NIST SP 800-115 Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment  39
● NIST SP 800-92 Guide to Computer Security Log Management  40
2.2	General	Technical	Controls		
2.2.1	Configuration	and	Maintenance	
Information systems are in a constant state of change influenced by a number of factors such as 
changes to support new features, patching software for correcting flaws and vulnerabilities and to 
accommodate new hardware or software to the system. To ensure that configuration changes made 
to systems do not adversely affect the security of the organization, a well-defined configuration 
management process that integrates information security is needed. A configuration management 
process should include a description of the roles, responsibilities, policies, and procedures that apply 
35 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSSEC 
36 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualys 
37 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puppet_%28software%29 
38 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/7316/NISTIR-7316.pdf 
39 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-115/SP800-115.pdf 
40 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-92/SP800-92.pdf 
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when managing the configuration of products and systems. 
 
A configuration management process should address: 
 
● identification and recording of configurations that impact the security posture of the 
information system and the organization; 
● the consideration of security risks in approving the initial configuration of systems; 
● the analysis of security implications of changes to the information system configuration; and 
● documentation of the approved/implemented changes. 
 
Additional resource: NIST Special Publication 800-128 “Guide for Security-Focused Configuration 
Management of Information Systems”  41
2.2.2	Operating	Systems	and	Device	Firmware	
Every device is controlled by something; all userspace software runs on something. That 'something' 
may provide points of entry for attackers, or it may simply enable ill-behaved user-installed software 
to do so. Nothing on a system can be trusted if the underlying operating system has been 
compromised. 
 
Rule 0 of operating system security is to apply security updates in a timely manner. Ideally, this is 
within hours, but a 48-hour window is not unreasonable for low-risk assets. 
 
When working with embedded devices, it is especially important to be certain that the firmware on 
any device that is difficult/expensive to replace or otherwise likely to be in long-term use is capable 
of being updated or replaced. Too often, these things are rushed to market with no way to ensure 
that known vulnerabilities ever get fixed. 
 
While the configuration of specific operating systems vary, the widely accepted best practice is to 
give not just every user but every process on the machine the most restrictive permissions possible 
(i.e., “least privilege”) while still getting the job done, and to isolate users and processes from one 
another to the greatest extent possible. 
 
For low-risk targets, keeping any appropriate OS properly configured and updated is enough. 
However, for higher-risk targets, such as servers that contain sensitive information or control 
systems for sensitive equipment, additional controls should be considered: 
 
● Restrict software running on the machine to the barest minimum: More software means 
more potential points of compromise. 
● Use virtualization or other segregation strategies (e.g., Linux chroot, BSD jails) to prevent one 
user or piece of software from accessing another's resources. 
● Keep sensitive systems physically separated (i.e., on different hardware) from one another 
and especially from less security-critical systems. 
● Use an operating system such as Linux or UNIX (e.g., BSD, AIX, Solaris, Illumos) that offers 
hardening kits to further secure the system with manageable maintenance overhead. SELinux 
41 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-128/sp800-128.pdf 
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is one such hardening system worth considering if you run Linux. One alternative to SELinux 
is grsecurity, but be aware that this option requires more advanced knowledge to correctly 
configure. 
● Microsoft Windows clients should use the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) 42
to enable exploit mitigations in software that is exposed to untrusted data, such as web 
browsers, PDF viewers, and Office applications. 
2.2.3	Network-level	Controls	
Networks provide the computer communication infrastructure for cyberinfrastructure projects. It is 
important to ensure that the way in which your network is designed and used does not inadvertently 
provide avenues of attack. Over the life of the project new devices will be added to the network and 
changes will be made to the network topology. 
 
In some cases, projects will make use of existing networks. Potentially, these networks will be under 
the control of either departmental, or campus IT organizations. In these cases, it is important for the 
project to understand their responsibility for being good network citizens. The following issues will 
still be important so take time to understand how the network owners address them and what your 
project must do to comply with their policies. 
  
Brand new network infrastructures offer a unique opportunity, in that they allow a project to design 
security from the start. Inherited infrastructures bring with them their existing security which may or 
may not be adequate for the job. When designing a new network take the time to do an evaluation 
of the security needs and how to make sure the environment will mitigate the risks identified. 
 
When securing your network, you should address the following ideas: 
 
Restrict devices to specific network segments 
In practice, user accessed devices such as print servers and file servers should be assigned to connect 
to a single segment in your network. 
 
Spotlight on Science: Network Protections for Science DMZs 
 
Science	DMZs	by	necessity	lack	the	stateful	firewall	and/or	VPN	protection	
relied	on	by	some	other	technologies.	Restricting	communication	to	a	
reasonable	set	of	IPs	as	well	as	carefully	monitoring	both	traffic	to/from	
and	activity	inside	the	Science	DMZ	are	essential	to	preventing	and	
responding	to	security	incidents.	
	
Science	DMZ	security	is	covered	in	more	detail	in	Section	2.7.2.	
 
Firewall 
Your project should have a default configuration for all firewalls. If you are unsure of how to go about 
configuring your firewall, check with your campus IT security department and they should be able to 
help. In many cases, campus or departmental IT organization provide firewall services. 
42 https://www.microsoft.com/emet 
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The following are good sources of information on firewall configuration: 
● SANS Institute Firewall Checklist  43
● Securing Your Network with Firewalls and Ports - MSDN  44
 
Electronic communications 
Internal clients and servers should not communicate directly with external systems. If a 
communication channel with external systems is needed some type of device, such as a firewall, 
should be used. 
 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
If possible, consider containing the information systems within a VPN. This will greatly reduce the 
attack surface since an adversary would have to compromise someone with VPN access before 
attacking the information systems within the VPN. 
 
Protecting DNS traffic 
DNS should be deployed in a way that it protects the internal system from direct manipulation. 
● NIST Securing DNS Guide How to Secure a Domain Name Server (DNS)  45
 
Use of secure routing protocols or static routes 
Either secure routing protocols or static routes should be used when exchanging information with 
outside parties. Best practice would be to never share routing information with any outside party. 
  
Deny use of source routing 
Source routing should not be allowed. 
2.2.4	Application	Administration	and	Use	
Selecting applications with good security track records is essential not only to the security of 
information and services handled by those applications, but also the security of the systems upon 
which they reside. Anything that faces a network connection should, at a minimum: 
 
● Have a prominently documented avenue for reporting bugs in general and security issues in 
particular. 
● Have clear documentation on how to configure the software in the most secure manner 
possible. 
● Have a reputation for promptly handling vulnerability reports. 
● Publicly document past vulnerabilities and in what software version(s) they are fixed. 
● Publicly document what authentication mechanisms and other security measures are used by 
the software. 
 
For open source applications, the ability to view the code and development activity directly can 
provide valuable insight into the project's security. It is worth checking that such projects are still 
43 http://www.sans.org/score/checklists/FirewallChecklist.pdf 
44 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms960403(v=cs.70).aspx 
45 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fasp/documents/network_security/NISTSecuringDNS/NISTSecuringDNS.htm 
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under active development, and that they are following the application development practices 
provided in the Application Development section. 
2.2.5	Managing	Data	Repositories	
Data repositories are usually comprised of at least one database. Along with the database providing 
organization to the structure of the data, tools are provided to make the querying of that data 
simpler for scientists.  
 
These repositories provide a place for scientists to store their data and also find information from 
other research projects. While it is common for these repositories to be open to the entire research 
community supported by the data, it is also common for certain parts of the data to be controlled by 
some type of access control logic. This could be to protect proprietary data or to keep research 
findings private until after publication. Good technical security practices should be supported by 
clear communications with the user community, as trust in security and privacy controls can be 
central to the success of a repository. 
 
When addressing security of the data repository, the first step that should be taken is to use 
standard, established database security practices. Additionally, a project might want to address the 
types of data they have in their repository and develop an information classification policy. See 
Section 2.2.6 immediately below. Other policies that should be developed around access control 
(see, 2.1.1) and disaster recovery (see, 2.6.1). 
2.2.6	Protecting	High	Value	&	Sensitive	Information	
Information itself, embodied as electronic data or otherwise, comprises the most fundamental asset 
in information security. As such, just as technical or physical information systems must be managed 
in line with a project’s mission and risk management processes, so too should information itself be 
managed and protected as warranted. While not all information that generates from, passes through, 
or is stored within a project carries heavy requirements for confidentiality, integrity, or availability, 
scientific CI may work with information carrying a variety of security and privacy requirements.  
 
Research data, including raw, time-sensitive, or one-of-a-kind -- and potentially huge -- data flows 
may be one of the most valuable, most science “mission critical” project assets of any kind. While 
there is a tendency to think first of confidentiality when considering the security of information, the 
research community is full of examples of information where the availability and integrity of 
information is essential to the scientific endeavor. 
 
High value and useful information is often also sensitive information, carrying both heightened 
security requirements and heightened risk of being targeted. That said, confidentiality requirements 
and concerns generate from myriad sources. Research, legal, regulatory, and ethical requirements 
may amplify the need to protect access to and distribution of information. Sources include federal 
and state privacy laws and regulations, export control laws, employment laws, contractual 
relationships, human subjects policies, institutional policies and practices, and the need for 
academic pre-publication secrecy.  
 
Many, if not all, of the controls and practices identified in this guide are relevant. The section below 
on Data Repositories highlights a few key controls for protecting electronic data. Additionally, a 
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comprehensive information security program will address the security and appropriate distribution 
of information in physical form (e.g., physically securing sensitive paper documents), as well as 
expectations, policies, and procedures regarding high value and sensitive information within 
personnels’ personal knowledge. Projects may wish to consider implementing a formal Information 
Classification Policy. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
The	Information	Classification	Policy	Template	may	be	used	
as	a	guide	to	picking	classification	categories	for	your	project’s	
data.	
 
Information classification policies support the management and protection of information by 
formalizing the categorization of information, and processes for making those categories a functional 
part of information handling. Put simply, these policies help organizations simplify and clarify how 
they communicate about information. This can be particularly critical for projects with information 
carrying confidentiality requirements. Creating, implementing, and enforcing an information 
classification policy requires judgment, ongoing effort, and understanding throughout an 
organization.  
 
Classification categories can and likely should be customized for a project’s security needs. There is 
no single standard for an information classification policy; a review of the available regimes indicates 
a variety of category labels , as well as some variety in concerns that underlie the particular choices. 46
We offer a few recommendations: 
 
● Classification category names should be descriptive of how the information should be 
handled, and clearly defined with examples. Consider using category names that clearly state 
who is authorized to have access to the information and the authorized scope of distribution.  
● The classifications assigned to specific pieces and types of information should logically 
reflect the level of risk associated with a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability 
of the information.  
● Over-classification of information should be avoided. Information that is not high risk should 
not be labeled as such. Compliance requirements based off information classification will 
require excessive controls that may not be needed if the information was correctly labeled as 
low risk. 
● Where possible, the information category should be embedded in and/or visible on the 
information itself. 
● Utilize the fewest number of discrete categories that reasonably aligns with your project’s 
security needs. Unnecessary complexity may hinder implementation and add confusion.  
 
46Information Class i fi cation Pol icy (ISO/IEC 27001:2005 A.7.2.1) 
http://www.iso27001securi ty.com/ISO27k_Model_pol icy_on_information_class i fi cation.pdf;  
CMU Guidel ines  for Data  Class i fi cation 
http://www.cmu.edu/iso/governance/guidel ines/data-class i fi cation.html ;  
Texas  State Data  Class i fi cation Pol icy Template 
https ://www2.dir.texas .gov/Si teCol lectionDocuments/Securi ty/Pol icies%20and%20Standards/data_class i fi cation_p
ol icy.rtf  
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Information classification may appear cumbersome as an organization kicks off implementation, but 
it becomes easier and part of the natural flow of working with information as an organization gains 
experience with the process. Moreover, the classification process can have the added benefit of 
increasing communication around the purpose and importance of an organization’s work. 
2.2.7	Hardware	Platforms	
Most hardware security concerns are handled with appropriate physical access policies. However, 
management of hardware presents risks on the networking and software/data levels. When 
considering the security of any hardware platform, make certain to give thought to the following: 
 
● Who will have physical access to the hardware, and how will those who shouldn't access it be 
prevented from doing so? (See the section on Physical Security) 
● How will the person managing the hardware access it? Can any firmware on the device be 
updated in the case of a security vulnerability? (See the subsection 'Operating Systems and 
Device Firmware' below) 
● How will data contained on the hardware be backed up? (See the section on Operational 
Risks) 
● How will the hardware's resources (power, network connection, environmental 
temperature) be maintained? (See the section on Physical Security) 
● If the hardware in question is an appliance (i.e., hardware that comes with a specialized 
software stack), is the software running on it reasonably secure? (See the subsection 
'Operating Systems and Device Firmware') 
2.2.8	Asset	Disposal	or	Redeployment	
FIPS-199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems 
states: “A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.” Proper disposal of 
system assets is one way to maintain confidentiality. The main concern is long term storage devices 
found in many modern assets. Mobile devices, photocopiers, printers, tablets and many other assets 
all contain some type of storage device. Your policy on disposal should include instructions on what 
to do to sanitize those media. Those instructions should include, at a minimum, direction on how to 
destroy or erase the contents of those storage devices found in all your assets. NIST Special 
Publication 800-88, “Guidelines for Media Sanitization”,  provides more details on how to 47
implement an asset disposal policy. 
 
Getting Started: 
 
The	Asset	Management	Policy	may	be	used	to	jump	start	your	
project’s	policy	creation.	
	
 
 
47 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-88/NISTSP800-88_with-errata.pdf 
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2.2.9	Mobile	Devices	and	BYOD	
Increased use of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) to access institutional networks and 
project information assets increases the number and scale of attack surfaces through which security 
incidents may originate. Meanwhile, the incidence of mobile malware is regularly reported as 
increasing rapidly.  Adding to the complexity of mobility’s security implications is the Bring Your 48
Own Device (BYOD) movement which has swept through the enterprise world, and is a familiar norm 
in many academic and research settings. While BYOD takes on many forms, it almost universally 
implicates dual work/personal use of mobile devices, i.e., personnel accessing work data and 
information systems via personal devices and/or using work devices in a variety of non-work settings 
and for non-work purposes. 
 
For science projects, the risks associated with mobile may be particularly relevant for projects with 
sensitive data and communications, or networked control systems. 
 
Mobility and BYOD have been two of the primary drivers away from purely perimeter oriented views 
of information security best practices. These readily moveable and often personally owned 
endpoints face an increased inherent risk of loss, theft, or simply coming into contact with 
non-personnel. It may be impractical or difficult to enforce the use of anti-virus software, and regular 
software updating. The many device operating systems that result from an entirely open BYOD 
environment means that not everyone’s device is equally securable. 
 
However, except in extremely sensitive environments, it may be impractical (and even unwise) to 
place more extreme controls in the way of mobile device use. Projects may lack the resources (or 
desire) to purchase work-only devices (particularly phones) for their employees, or purchase and 
implement a mobile device management (MDM) solution. As such, policies and personnel education 
around those policies are key. Consider the following steps: 
 
● As always, review and align to parent institution policies. 
● Require that all mobile devices accessing project data or systems to be maintained with 
up-to-date operating system patches. Devices running Android operating systems often lack 
features to protect data (encryption, remote wiping) and more than 60% are running 
unpatched OSs from two years ago or older . Caution should be given with allowing access to 49
sensitive data from an Android platform. 
● Require basic, included security controls (e.g., unlock codes, data encryption, remote wiping 
and device locating capabilities) to be turned on. 
● Require personnel to report mobile device theft/loss to the project within a tight window 
following the event and require the personnel to change any passwords that were exposed 
to the mobile device. 
● Forbid personnel from accessing sensitive data or systems from unapproved devices. 
● Forbid personnel from accessing sensitive data or systems from insecure open WiFi networks 
without using a VPN. 
 
48 McAfee Labs Threats Report, June 2014, p.19, Available: 
http://www.mcafee.com/hk/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q1-2014.pdf  
49 Android Developer Dashboards, See the Platform Versions section at 
https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html 
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These policies may be captured in an acceptable use policy, an employee handbook, or even in a 
standalone mobile usage policy. Regardless, your project’s mobile policies should be part of your 
information security training and awareness program. 
2.2.10	Supervisory	Control	and	Data	Acquisition	(SCADA)	
In 2010 the discovery of the Stuxnet worm demonstrated how industrial control systems, such as 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and programmable logic controller (PLC) systems, 
could be subverted by an attacker. Even systems protected by air-gap networking, physically isolated 
from unsecured networks, became victims of the worm via infected USB devices inserted in the 
systems. 
 
Some large facilities in the CI community may use SCADA systems for controlling large equipment 
such as telescopes or wind farms. Additionally, SCADA may be used for infrastructure services 
including power distribution systems, heating/cooling systems, ventilation and air treatment 
systems. If your project uses industrial controls, it’s critical to ensure they are protected from and 
resistant to malicious attacks. Hacking an industrial control system can result in corrupted data, 
service interruptions, physical damage to equipment and can even threaten human life. 
 
Some industrial controls lack the ability to have their firmware updated to address vulnerabilities 
making them defenseless targets for attackers. Therefore it’s imperative that equipment vendors 
have a comprehensive program to maintain the security of their products. In addition, projects that 
use industrial controls should have a strong communication and service relationship with equipment 
vendors in order to get critical ongoing support. 
 
Securing SCADA systems is unsurprisingly similar to the process outlined earlier in the “Establishing a 
Risk Management Framework” section of this guide. This process begins with understanding your 
SCADA system (system characterization), identifying threats to the SCADA system, identifying system 
vulnerabilities, conduct a threat/impact/probability analysis and selection of controls to mitigate the 
risk. 
 
The Department of Energy publishes a guide to improve cybersecurity of SCADA networks.  50
 
SCADA Cyber Security Testbed Development  51
 
An Evaluation of Cybersecurity Assessment Tools on a SCADA Environment  52
 
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) offers several resources 
on the best practices for securing control systems and SCADA equipment.  53
¶
¶
50 http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/21_Steps_-_SCADA.pdf 
51 http://www.linklings.net/MOSES/papers/NAPS06-258.pdf 
52 http://powercyber.ece.iastate.edu/publications/conf_sec_tools.pdf 
53 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/ 
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2.3	Managing	Relationships	&	Social	Controls	
2.3.1	Training	and	Awareness	
Efforts aimed at personnel training and awareness are widely, if not universally, considered part of 
any comprehensive organizational cybersecurity program. Human beings, including well-meaning, 
non-adversarial organizational personnel, are often described as the “weakest link” in any 
cybersecurity effort. The positive impact of well-written policies and highly-tailored technical 
controls can hinge on personnel awareness, understanding, and compliance. 
 
Projects should establish, implement, and maintain cybersecurity awareness and training activities 
for all personnel. Consider including the following content: 
 
● Communicating why cybersecurity efforts are important to the project and the potential 
impact of cybersecurity incidents 
● Information on common cybersecurity threats and how to identify and respond to them 
● Review of the projects’ policies and procedures, including roles and responsibilities, incident 
response plans 
● Close review of the policies that require personnel action or attention 
 
Awareness and training activities need not necessarily be highly involved and time-consuming, but 
they should be regular and direct. Whether quarterly, biannually, or annually, all personnel should 
participate on a recurring basis. Additional resources on security awareness and training include: 
NIST Special Publication 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training 
Program.  54
 
Getting	Started:	
	
You	may	use	the	Information	Security	Training	and	Awareness	Policy	
Template	as	a	basis	for	writing	a	policy	specific	to	your	project	or	
organization’s	needs.	
 
CTSC has made available an information security training presentation that may be used for your 
organization: CTSC Information Security Training slidedeck  was structured off the Texas Department 55
of Information Resources  - “Security Training Policy Template”. 56
	
	
54 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-50/NIST-SP800-50.pdf  
55 http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/trainingdeck/CyberHygiene 
56 
http://www2.dir.s tate.tx.us/Si teCol lectionDocuments/Securi ty/Pol icies%20and%20Standards/securi ty_tra ining_pol i
cy.doc 
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2.3.2	Resource	Users	
Acceptable use policies (AUPs) are a common way for organizations to communicate to resource users 
the acceptable, and unacceptable, uses of information systems, including networks, websites, 
compute resources, as well as repercussions of violating those policies. We include a template AUP 
to consider tailoring to your project’s needs. We encourage you to develop a clear, concise AUP, 
written in plain language. AUPs should be made readily available to users, and where feasible 
require explicit acknowledgment prior to resource access. Even if your AUP is written with a third 
party user (e.g., a researcher) in mind, consider whether requiring acknowledgment by project 
personnel is appropriate. Finally, AUPs can be documents of particular legal significance, and may 
include contractually binding language, as well as other legal statements. We strongly encourage you 
to seek legal assistance (e.g., from your institution’s general counsel’s office) prior to implementing 
an AUP.  
 
Getting Started: 
 
The	Acceptable	Use	Policy	Template	may	be	used	to	help	
develop	an	AUP	specific	to	your	project.	
 
Privacy policies are an increasingly common fixture for websites and online services of all kinds. In 
general, they communicate to users the ways the resource provider gathers, uses, discloses and 
manages data regarding user, and may include details regarding when and how users will be notified 
in the event of an actual or potential leak of personal information. Like AUPs, privacy policies can be 
documents of particular legal significance. Depending on the site or service you offer, to whom you 
are offering it, what legal entities are involved, the parties’ jurisdictional locations, and a host of 
other factors, your project may want and/or be required to have a privacy policy (or policies), and the 
policy may be required to meet particular requirements. We strongly encourage you to seek legal 
assistance (e.g., from your institution’s general counsel’s office) for assistance in determining the 
need for, as well as writing and implementing, a privacy policy. 
2.3.3	Partners	&	Contractors	
Relationships with partners and contractors can take many forms, from contractual business 
relationships to informal collaboration. For addressing information security in the context of these 
relationships, we offer a few broad recommendations: 
 
● Communicate and formalize expectations at the outset of the relationship. Whether through 
contractual terms (e.g., in service level agreement (SLA)), a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU), or other clear communications, getting on the same page (literally) is critical. It may 
be important for your organization to share key information security policies with your 
partners, and/or request to review the corresponding policies. An MOU might include the 
following mutual agreements: 
○ Notify partners of any incident or compromise as soon as possible. 
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○ Ensure that system administrators and security personnel cooperate with the 
organization in a timely manner and follow formal processes agreed upon in advance. 
○ Perform a thorough vulnerability assessment of any new resource. 
○ Maintain all systems with the latest security patches, closing vulnerabilities in a 
timely manner commensurate with risk levels of the particular vulnerability. 
○ Keep confidential information safe and not disclose information to an external party 
without the approval of all parties involved. 
○ Disclose information internally on strictly a need-to-know basis. 
○ Make all security policies, guidelines, and procedures readily available to staff and 
users. 
● Communicate internally and with parent organizations. Your organization’s personnel may 
need explicit input on how to interface with partner organizations in order to reduce 
information security risks. Many players may be involved in setting up formal relationships 
with vendors and contractors, and your project may well need to play an active role in 
communicating with multiple parties to ensure that information security is addressed. 
● Ensure a reasonable level of visibility into the third parties’ activity, so you have an 
opportunity to identify emergent security concerns. 
2.4	Physical	Controls		
Physical access to computing resources and/or the infrastructure they rely on exposes a number of 
attack vectors, as physical access can be used to bypass many non-physical security controls such as 
firewall rules, filesystem permissions, and user login requirements. As with any other form of access, 
physical access to resources should be limited to the minimum needed for each individual to fulfill 
his/her work functions. Special care should be given to assess risks associated with the infrastructure 
supporting each computing resource, and to the higher vulnerability of mobile devices to theft or 
tampering compared to devices bound to a single location. 
 
According to FIPS 200, “organizations must: 
(i) limit physical access to information systems, equipment, and the respective operating 
environments to authorized individuals; 
(ii) protect the physical plant and support infrastructure for information systems; 
(iii) provide supporting utilities for information systems; 
(iv) protect information systems against environmental hazards; and 
(v) provide appropriate environmental controls in facilities containing information systems.” 
 
Getting Started: 
The	Physical	Security	Policy	Template	may	be	used	to	simplify	
the	creation	of	an	appropriate	policy	for	your	project.	
 
When using the template, it is important to be mindful of risks and protections inherent in using 
facilities belonging to or shared with other organizations.  
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2.4.1	Plan	and	Protection	
The physical and environmental security policy should identify risks to the systems and facilities to 
address unauthorized physical access, loss, damage or interference. Basically, any risk that could 
cause interruptions to its critical operations should be considered when looking at controls for 
physical security.  
2.4.2	Monitoring,	Logging,	and	Retention	
A project should have technical and procedural controls in place for monitoring physical security. 
These should include logging of access to devices so that individuals can be identified as to who and 
when the access was made. Also, consider whether there are regulatory or compliance requirements 
for retention of records. 
2.4.3	Maintenance	and	Testing	
Like cybersecurity, your physical security system must be tested periodically to ensure it operates 
correctly. Testing and maintenance records of the physical security should be kept for a period of 
time. The length of time these records are kept can be determined by the project but might also be 
affected by regulatory or compliance issues. 
 
Resources: 
● NIST SP 800-12: An Introduction to Computer Security: Physical And Environmental Security  57
● DHHS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: Physical and Environmental Security Policy  58
● University of Miami School of Medicine: Physical and environmental security  59
 
2.5	Application	Development	
A complete overview of secure coding practices is beyond the scope of this document. However, it is 
worth addressing some general points, including language and framework selection, handling 
vulnerability reports, and concerns specific to the development of web applications. 
2.5.1	Languages	and	Frameworks	
When selecting a language or development framework for a project, many of the same things that 
lead to good code in general are also important to security. First and foremost, choose to build on a 
platform that is actively maintained and preferably open source. The deprecation of a platform tends 
to lead to stagnant and usually vulnerable code in dependent applications, which in turn means that 
security updates are unlikely to happen at all in practice, regardless of the intentions of a project's 
developers. Too often, deprecation of an application’s underlying framework leads to neglect of that 
application. An application that does not receive developer attention over a long term usually 
aggregates unpatched but known security flaws -- flaws that are potential points of entry for an 
attack. While choosing an open source language or framework does not completely eliminate this 
57 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/800-12-html/chapter15.html 
58 http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dhs/pol-80/man/07physical_env_security.pdf 
59 http://it.med.miami.edu/x2230.xml 
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possibility, if an open source tool in active use is abandoned by its creators, it is normally picked up 
and continued by members of its user community. 
 
Of secondary concern is whether the language's libraries or the chosen framework provide the 
primitives necessary for developers who are not themselves security experts to develop secure 
applications. This includes reliable cryptographic primitives, authentication systems, functions for 
sanitizing user input, and -- in some cases -- facilities for recognizing patterns associated with abuse 
of a service or resource. Small projects especially cannot bear the overhead of developing these 
tools in house with the amount of research, attention, and constant review and upkeep necessary, so 
choosing the right development stack is essential. 
2.5.2	Vulnerability	Reports	
Handling vulnerability reports is one place where small software development projects often fall 
down. First of all, the correct avenue for reporting vulnerabilities must be absolutely clear to the 
software's entire user base. At least, a cursory reading of the project's main web page must reveal 
how to report a security vulnerability. Reporters should be requested to keep vulnerability reports 
confidential until the project has had time to issue a fix. However, project maintainers must 
understand that those who discover vulnerabilities may not be under any obligation not to release 
said knowledge publicly. The project's handling of the incident may heavily influence whether the 
person reporting a vulnerability discloses it privately or not. 
 
Vulnerability reports should be handled as quickly as possible, especially for software that may be 
handling sensitive information or controlling sensitive equipment. First, reply to the person who 
reported the vulnerability and engage them in the process. Not contacting someone who's submitted 
a vulnerability in a timely manner (less than one business day ideally, up to a week for small or 
pre-release projects) will often lead to that person assuming that the vulnerability is not being 
addressed and release information about it publicly. 
 
Like any bug, a security vulnerability should be patched and a regression test created to prevent it 
from being re-introduced. When an update is issued to the software's consumers, it should be made 
absolutely clear what systems are impacted (e.g., "this may affect your system if you compiled in 
support for TLS"), the severity of the problem, and what it may allow an attacker to do.  
 
It is important to differentiate security patches from other software improvements for the benefit of 
users who do less-frequent updates when security is not at issue, and to number or otherwise 
uniquely identify each vulnerability so that it can be referenced with clarity. 
2.5.3	Web	Applications	
While web applications are not, at their core, more of a security risk than other software 
development, they deserve special attention due to their march toward ubiquity, the likelihood that 
data from more than one user or organization will end up centralized on one system, the readiness 
with which they are remotely attacked, and the difficulty in finding any attackers. Developers 
working on web applications should be mindful of OWASP's Top Ten list of web vulnerabilities  as 60
well as development best practices for the language or framework in use. When possible, web 
applications that handle sensitive data should undergo routine penetration testing by a security 
60 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project 
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professional. 
 
Spotlight on Science: Gateways On the Web 
 
Remember	that	many	science	gateways	include	a	web	application	
as	a	component.	When	implementing	or	maintaining	a	science	
gateway,	it	is	important	to	consider	all	aspects	of	web	application	
security	with	regard	to	any	interface	that	operates	over	HTTP	or	
similar	protocols.	
 
2.6	Emergency	Preparation	and	Response		
2.6.1	Contingency	Planning	
Contingency planning is an important part of an overall disaster recovery plan. Contingency plans 
deal with using interim measures to recover a system after a disruption of services. NIST 800-34 
states: “Interim measures may include relocation of information systems and operations to an 
alternate site, recovery of information system functions using alternate equipment, or performance 
of information system functions using manual methods.” 
 
Contingency and disaster recovery planning are much like information security planning. These 
plans, like risk management, should identify potential vulnerabilities and threats and then 
implement approaches to either prevent such incidents from happening or limit their potential 
impact. 
 
NIST 800-34 identifies the following steps as a planning process that a project may apply to develop 
and maintain a viable recovery program for their information systems. 
1. Identify assets. Identify and prioritize information systems and components critical to 
supporting the project’s mission/business processes. 
2. Identify preventive controls. Measures taken to reduce the effects of system disruptions can 
increase system availability and reduce contingency life cycle costs. 
3. Create contingency strategies. Thorough recovery strategies ensure that the system may be 
recovered quickly and effectively following a disruption. 
4. Develop an information system contingency plan. The contingency plan should contain 
detailed guidance and procedures for restoring a damaged system unique to the system’s 
security impact level and recovery requirements. 
5. Ensure plan testing, training, and exercises. Testing validates recovery capabilities, whereas 
training prepares recovery personnel for plan activation and exercising the plan identifies 
planning gaps; combined, the activities improve plan effectiveness and overall organization 
preparedness. 
6. Ensure plan maintenance. The plan should be a living document that is updated regularly to 
remain current with system enhancements and organizational changes. 
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Getting Started: 
 
The	Disaster	Recovery	Policy	Template	may	be	used	to	develop	
a	policy	tailored	to	your	project,	based	on	NIST	Special	Publication	
800-34	“Contingency	Planning	Guide	for	Federal	Information	
Systems”.)	
 
Resources: 
● NIST SP800-34 “Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems”   61
● Department of Health and Human Services Enterprise Performance Life Cycle framework: 
Contingency Plan  62
● Cisco Disaster Recovery: Best Practices  63
● SANS InfoSec Reading Room: Computer Security Considerations in Disaster Recovery 
Planning  64
● SearchDisasterRecovery.com: IT Disaster Recovery Plan Template  65
● everyday-tech.com: How To Create A Disaster Recovery Plan  66
● Sybase Checklist for Disaster Recovery  67
2.6.2	Incident	Handling	
Regardless of the security measures put in place for an information system, there remains the 
possibility of unauthorized access to the system and its data, commonly referred to as a "computer 
security incident". What constitutes an incident will depend on the organization and the system or 
resources involved. Examples of incidents include attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems 
or data, denial of service, unauthorized use of resources, or changes to system hardware, software, 
or data without the owner's consent. An organization should prepare for a possible incident by 
designating individuals who can handle the analysis, mitigation, and notification of the incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
61 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-34-rev1/sp800-34-rev1_errata-Nov11-2010.pdf 
62 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocio/eplc/EPLC%20Archive%20Documents/36-Contingency-Disaster%20Recovery%20Plan/epl
c_contingency_plan_practices_guide.pdf 
63 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/technologies/collateral/tk869/tk769/white_paper_c11-453495.html 
64 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/recovery/computer-security-considerations-disaster-recovery-pl
anning-1512 
65 
http://cdn.ttgtmedia .com/searchDisasterRecovery/downloads/SearchDisasterRecovery_IT_DisasterRecoveryTempl
ate.doc 
66 http://everyday-tech.com/how-to-create-a-disaster-recovery-plan/ 
67 http://www.sybase.com/sb_content/1029285/dr_checklist.pdf 
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Getting Started: 
 
The	Incident	Response	Policy	and	Procedures	Template	may	
be	used	to	develop	an	appropriate	policy	and	the	procedures	
required	to	execute	an	IR	plan.	
	
References: 
● NIST SP 800-61 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide  68
● NIST SP 800-86 Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response  69
● NIST SP 800-83 Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops
 70
 
Spotlight on Science: Notify Helpdesk 
 
It	is	not	uncommon	for	incident	reports	that	should	go	to	a	
particular	project	to	end	up	at	the	parent	organization’s	help	desk,	
simply	because	the	reporter	isn’t	sure	where	to	go.	It	never	hurts	to	
provide	the	parent	organization’s	helpdesk	with	contact	
information	needed	to	make	sure	incidents	are	properly	reported.	
 
2.7	Concerns	Unique	to	Science	
Often, the biggest challenge in cybersecurity for science is that science often uses technologies and 
processes that are outside the mainstream. Science itself is extremely varied in its technology needs. 
So, it is not uncommon for a project or organization to need to figure out how to secure a system or 
systems for which there isn’t a great deal of explicit guidance available. 
 
Many unique-looking science systems are aggregates of well-understood techniques and 
technologies. Often, breaking something complex, such as a science gateway, down into component 
technologies (e.g., web application/portal, database servers, and job queues for industrial controls) 
will produce useful insight as to what controls may be needed. Another, often complementary, 
approach is to carefully characterize the system itself, and work from there. 
 
Asking the following questions when approaching such an information system will put one well on 
the way to an understanding of how to secure it: 
 
● What are this system’s components? 
● Are there known best practices for any of the component technologies? What are they? 
● How do these components interact with one another? 
○ Do they need to authenticate with one another? If so, how is that accomplished? 
68 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf 
69 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-86/SP800-86.pdf 
70 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-83r1.pdf 
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○ Where are the boundaries between the components? How is this separation 
maintained, especially where it impacts the movement of information or control over 
code and configuration? 
○ How do the system’s various components communicate with one another? 
● Who is authorized to access the system and what privileges do they possess? 
● How does the system handle authentication and authorization on a technical level? 
● What APIs does the system offer? How are other applications expected to use the APIs, and 
what protections are in place to prevent undesired behaviors? 
● How is the system’s data stored? 
○ Don’t forget to look at backups as well as the primary data storage. 
● What level of accounting/logging is needed? 
● What other data can be accessed via the system? 
● What equipment can be controlled via the system? 
● What platform(s) and language(s) were used to build the system? 
● If system components are developed in-house, is the development team using best practices 
to maintain the security of the code base? 
2.7.1	Custom	Scientific	Equipment	
In addition to commodity information technology hardware and software, many projects may use 
unique equipment that serves a specific role in the research process. For instance, interferometers 
may be used for measuring gravitational waves and Digital Optical Modules (DOMs) for measuring 
neutrinos. Projects measuring environmental data across a large geographic area may use specialized 
field instrumentation to create wireless sensor networks.  
 
Custom scientific equipment requires the same security attention as commodity hardware and 
software and often even greater attention, as such equipment may constitute a project’s largest 
investment and most mission critical asset. Some custom equipment can be remotely controlled by a 
network connection which increases the risk of unauthorized access and/or abuse. The abuse or 
misuse of certain types of equipment can result in physical damage to the instrument and it’s 
surrounds, including the threat to human life. 
 
Another form of abuse that is becoming more common is the misuse of resources in scientific 
research for monetary gain.  CI projects offer the community tremendously powerful resources that 71
could be exploited to mine digital currency that can be converted into traditional currencies.  For 
instance, having each user agree to observe an acceptable use policy that bans the abuse of 
resources, along with a network monitoring service that detects mining activity and communications 
would be effective controls to minimize this risk. 
2.7.2	Science	DMZ	
Science DMZs  came into being as an approach to provide the low-latency, high-bandwidth 72
connections demanded by scientific computing applications without giving up on security. Because a 
Science DMZ exists at the edge of its local network (or as close as possible thereto), typically outside 
71 Tim Hornyak. (2014, June 5). US Researcher Banned for Mining Bitcoin Using University Supercomputers. CIO 
[Online] Available: 
http://www.cio.com/article/753803/US_Researcher_Banned_for_Mining_Bitcoin_Us ing_Univers i ty_Supercomputers  
72 https://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/ 
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institutional firewall and monitoring infrastructure, seeing to the DMZ’s security needs typically falls 
to the project running it rather than larger institutional resources. 
 
Much of a Science DMZ’s speed is owed to its avoidance of stateful firewalls and traffic shaping 
mechanisms normally in place on large enterprise networks. Network-level security is often handled 
largely or even solely through router ACLs. This particular approach is most effective when those 
ACLs are automatically updated in response to information gathered by an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) such as the Bro Security Network Monitor.  Bro keeps detailed records of 73
application-layer state. Its analytics can be mapped to behavioral patterns of end users, so 
automated security scripts can respond in real-time, e.g., updating router ACLs or notifying security 
on-call personnel.  
 
In addition to helping to keep traffic moving, network performance monitoring tools such as 
perfSONAR  can enhance security on a Science DMZ. Such tools will give the project a clear 74
understanding of how the flow of traffic is moving on the network, information that may aid in 
coping with, e.g., DDoS attacks. 
  
Collecting session data, such as netflow or IPFIX, is useful because it can be done passively, providing 
situational awareness for the network without adversely affecting network performance. This data, 
especially when correlated with data from an IDS like Bro, can help identify outlier behaviors that 
may be early indicators of malicious activity, e.g., an attacker’s lateral movement within the network, 
command and control traffic, or data exfiltration. Since session data does not contain the contents of 
the traffic, it does not take up much space, allowing an extensive history to be saved and analysed. 
SiLK  and Argus  are two session data suites that may be used for this type of data collection and 75 76
analysis. 
 
Further reading: 
Science DMZ Security - Firewalls vs. Router ACLs  77
2.7.3	Science	Gateways	
A science gateway is a set of tools, applications, and data collections that are integrated via a portal 
or a suite of applications. Gateways provide access to a variety of capabilities including workflows, 
visualization, resource discovery, and job execution services, allowing scientists around the world to 
more effectively collaborate using shared cyberinfrastructure and data.  
 
Each of these topics is covered in this guide and more information may be found at the Gateway 
Security website . 78
	
73 http://bro-ids.org/ 
74 http://www.perfsonar.net/ 
75 https://tools.netsa.cert.org/silk/docs.html 
76 http://qosient.com/argus/argusnetflow.shtml 
77 https://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/science-dmz-security/ 
78 http://www.sciencegatewaysecurity.org 
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Appendix:	Templates,	Forms,	and	Resources	
All templates and forms can be found and copied at trustedci.org/guide. 
Template	Policies	
Acceptable Use Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/AUP  
Set of rules that a user must agree to follow in order to be provided with access to a network and/or 
resources. Used to reduce liability and act as a reference for enforcement of policy. 
 
Access Control Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/ACP  
Defines the resources being protected and the rules that control access to them. 
 
Asset Management Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/AMP  
Requirements for managing capital equipment including: inventory, licensing information, 
maintenance, and protection of hardware and software assets. 
 
Asset-Specific Access and Privilege Specification http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/asset_access  
List of roles, privilege levels and their justification for an asset. 
 
Disaster Recovery Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/recovery  
Contains policies and procedures for dealing with various types of disasters that can affect the 
organization. 
 
Incident Response Policy and Procedures Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/IR  
A pre-defined organized approach to addressing and managing a security incident. 
 
Information Asset Inventory Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/IAI  
Provides a framework for cataloguing and describing a project’s assets relevant to cybersecurity, i.e., 
both information and information systems. 
 
Information Classification Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/info_class  
Used to ensure consistency in classification and protection of data. 
 
Information Security Training and Awareness Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/TAP  
Outlines an organization's strategy for educating employees and communicating policies and 
procedures for working with information technology (IT). 
 
Master Information Security Policy & Procedures Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/MISPP  
Represents the core information security policies and procedures including information 
security-related roles and responsibilities; references to other, special purpose policies; and the core 
procedures for developing, implementing, and maintaining the information security program. 
 
Password Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/password  
A set of rules designed to establish security requirements for passwords and password management. 
 
Physical Security Policy Template http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/physical  
Details measures taken to protect systems, buildings, and related supporting infrastructure against 
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threats associated with their physical environment. 
Forms	&	Tables	
Personnel Exit Checklist http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/exitlist  
Form to be completed at the end of employment that addresses revoking access to resources, 
physical space and the return of organizational assets. 
 
Risk Assessment Table http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/RAtable 
Spreadsheet for doing semi-quantitative risk assessments based on the method presented in Section 
1; especially helpful in that it automates the math and highlights risk levels for a nice visual 
presentation. 
Resources	
Securing Commodity IT in Scientific CI Projects: Baseline Controls and Best Practices 
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/commodityIT 
Best practices to establish a baseline level of information security practice for commodity 
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. 
 
CTSC Infosec Training Slidedeck http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/trainingdeck/CyberHygiene 
A set of slides for personnel training on good, general cybersecurity “hygiene.” 
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